University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Adam Liska Papers

Biological Systems Engineering

7-2017

Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Climate:
Probability, Increasing Risks, and Perception
Adam Liska
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, aliska2@unl.edu

Tyler R. White
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, twhite4@unl.edu

Eric Holley
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, ericholley17@gmail.com

Robert J. Oglesby
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, roglesby2@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/bseliska
Part of the Bioresource and Agricultural Engineering Commons, Climate Commons,
Environmental Health and Protection Commons, Environmental Indicators and Impact Assessment
Commons, Environmental Monitoring Commons, Geochemistry Commons, Nuclear Engineering
Commons, Other Engineering Commons, Other Environmental Sciences Commons, Other
Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology Commons, and the Risk Analysis
Commons
Liska, Adam; White, Tyler R.; Holley, Eric; and Oglesby, Robert J., "Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Climate: Probability, Increasing
Risks, and Perception" (2017). Adam Liska Papers. 29.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/bseliska/29

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biological Systems Engineering at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Adam Liska Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
in a Changing Climate:
Probability,
Increasing R isks,
and Perception

M

any people tend to
think that the outcome of any nuclear
weapons use today
will result in an escalatory situation with apocalyptic outcomes for the countries involved.1 Yet
many factors are increasing the probability of the limited use of nuclear weap22   ENVIRONMENT

ons (e.g., 1 to 20 warheads) in a range
of conflict scenarios. Previous atmospheric model simulations of regional
nuclear conflicts employing many relatively small bombs have been estimated
to cause a global “nuclear autumn,” with
great reductions in agricultural productivity, stratospheric ozone loss, and
spread of hazardous radioactive fallWWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

out.2 The totality of these effects would
result in widespread damage to human
well-being and to terrestrial and aquatic
ecosystems. In this article, we estimate
minimum thresholds for the prevalent
types of currently deployed nuclear
weapons that would cause equivalent
climate impacts, and provide a discussion of the factors that may influence
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A nuclear-capable Trident D5 SLBM test over
San Francisco on November 7, 2015.

Caters News Agency/Abe Blair

by Adam J. Liska, Tyler R. White,
Eric R. Holley, and Robert J. Oglesby

the probability of nuclear weapons use,
current risk perception, and possible
mitigation actions.
Due to probabilistic realities, Cambridge physicist Stephen Hawking recently concluded that future use of
nuclear weapons is highly probable, perhaps even inevitable, given the passage
of enough time.3 Former U.S. Secretary
JULY/AUGUST 2017

of Defense William Perry also recently
warned, “Today, the danger of some sort
of nuclear catastrophe is greater than
it was during the Cold War.”4 Secretary
Perry, speaking about the implications
of even a limited nuclear exchange, said,
“The political, economic and social consequences are beyond what people understand.” Two other former U.S. SecWWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

retaries of Defense, Robert McNamara
and Graham Allison, and numerous
nuclear weapons specialists have also
suggested that future use is probable.5
In previous regional nuclear war
simulations, roughly 100 nuclear explosions with 15-KT (kilotons) TNT yields
were estimated to ignite 1,300 square
kilometers of urban and other develENVIRONMENT   23

as much as 20% to 80% in the Asian
monsoon region.10 Large reductions in
rainfall would occur in South America
and southern Africa, and the American
Southwest and Western Australia could
be 20% to 60% drier. Climatic changes
due to nuclear explosions on developed
land could essentially produce a global
“nuclear drought,” and the resulting
famines could kill up to a billion people
from starvation, which would probably
most affect those communities that are
already in food-insecure environments
in the developing world, particularly
in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and
the Middle East.11 Significant changes
in precipitation would probably also
increase conflict in developing regions,
although global temperature reductions may reduce social violence in
the United States and other developed
countries.12
Natural systems are also at grave risk,
not just local to where the conflagration takes place, but also remotely, and
potentially worldwide. Of particular

importance are potential consequences
for ecosystems and affected biodiversity. Widespread (though low-level)
radiation has been reported throughout much of the Pacific basin several
years after the Fukushima disaster in
March 2011, which implies that radiation and other pollutants due to even
a limited nuclear strike could be similarly dispersed.13 The spread of toxic
radionuclides and their long-term effects would also be greatly magnified if
a nuclear reactor, a nuclear power plant,
or a nuclear weapons stockpile were to
be targeted in any potential nuclear conflict, with the latter being the most likely
set of targets out of the three.14 In 2016,
former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto
Kan said that had the Fukushima nuclear power plant melted down further,
the spread of radiation could have been
worse than the Chernobyl disaster, and
he stated, “The future existence of Japan
as a whole was at stake.”15
Due to irreversible physical processes described by the second law of

iStock/TkKurikawa

oped land area.6 The resulting oxidation
of carbonaceous materials (e.g., soils,
biomass, fossil fuels, asphalt, plastics)
was estimated to disperse >5 million
metric tons (5 Tg C) of black carbon
smoke particles into the stratosphere.7
Most previous nuclear explosions have
not produced significant black carbon
emissions because they occurred in the
U.S. Southwest desert, on small tropical islands, at high altitudes, or underground.8
As a consequence of 5 Tg of black carbon being lofted into the stratosphere,
solar radiation on land, atmospheric
surface temperature, and rainfall would
decrease globally and would likely result
in a dramatic decrease in global agricultural production. Agricultural growing
seasons could be reduced by 10 to 40
days per year for at least 5 years; global
temperatures could be below normal
for as long as 25 years; and immediate
short-term temperatures could be colder
than have occurred in the last 1,000
years.9 Precipitation could decrease by

Anti-nuclear occupy tent protest against the Japanese government in Tokyo, Japan, on May 8, 2015.
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Table 1. Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles and Types by Country in 2016: Test Dates,28 and
Number Deployed, Reserve, and Total,29 as Strategic and Tactical30
Tactical

Total Stockpile

United States

Country

1945

1,590

2,260

2,600

860–1,040

6,800

Russia

1949

1,790

2,700

2,152

825

7,000

United Kingdom

1952

120

95

215

0

215

France

1960

280

10

200

80

300

China

1964

0

260

260

0

260

India

1974

0

110–120

110–120

0

110–120

Pakistan

1998

0

120–130

120–130

Upgrading

120–130

—

0

80

Unknown

Unknown

80

2006

0

4–20

4–20

0

4–20

Israel
North Korea

First Nuclear Test Deployed Reserve Strategic

thermodynamics, complex patterns in
physical systems are less probable than
disordered systems consisting of smaller
molecules and random atomic motion,
which is why complex dynamic structures have limited lifetimes and disintegrate and diffuse when energy becomes
limited, and why continual energy use
is needed to reproduce or recreate them
and work against the tendency toward
disorder and increasing entropy.16 Because of these physical principles, “it’s
always a lot easier to and quicker to destroy something than it is to build it,”
which is why risk analysts are always
preparing for the next catastrophe, with
potential nuclear events being perhaps
the most cataclysmic.17

Potential for Future Limited
Use of Nuclear Weapons
Jeffrey Larson, Director of Research
at the NATO Defense College, recently
defined “limited nuclear war” as “a conflict in which nuclear weapons are used
in small numbers and in a constrained
manner in pursuit of limited objectives
(or are introduced by a country or nonstate actor in the face of conventional
defeat).”18 Limited use of nuclear weapons by either the United States or other
nuclear actors is seen by U.S. military
strategists as possible to occur, either
as demonstrations to signal willingness
to escalate conflicts; to achieve conflict
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termination if the United States or an
ally is in serious military jeopardy; as
retaliation for a chemical or biological
weapons attack (or substantial cyberattack or nuclear terrorist attack); or to
secure a nuclear state that has lost control of its weapons, among other possible scenarios; many of these situations
could lead to use of nuclear weapons on
noncivilian targets.19 There are also concerns that greater accuracy in warhead
delivery coupled with lower yield weapons produced in nuclear modernization
programs may lower the threshold for
future nuclear weapons use.20 In evaluating the emerging nuclear landscape
in 2014, James J. Wirtz, the Dean of the
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, stated,
“Emerging nuclear powers exhibit clear
indications that they do in fact see great
utility in nuclear deterrence to include
interest in the strategic and tactical use
of their nuclear arsenals to achieve their
security objectives.”21 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who
participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962, had repeatedly emphasized that
humans and politicians are not always
rational, and our indefinite capacity for
fallibility increases the probability of
nuclear weapons use, given their widespread deployment.22 Many observers
today are concerned that nuclear actors may fumble into circumstances,
or make “miscalculations,” where these
weapons are used.23

WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

Nuclear policy analysts have found
recent troubling developments in the
policies of Russia, Pakistan, and India concerning the first use of nuclear
weapons. Many analysts agree that the
shifting nuclear force postures and doctrines of these states makes a limited
nuclear exchange much more probable to occur. Pakistan and India have
come close to a regional nuclear exchange three times in recent decades.24
Paul Bernstein at the National Defense
University in Washington, D.C., stated,
“Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, while officially still described as ‘credible minimum deterrence,’ in fact has evolved
toward one reliant on the early first use
of nuclear weapons.”25 Russian President
Vladimir Putin recently announced his
country’s intentions to “strengthen the
military potential of strategic nuclear
forces,” specifically the ability of Russian
missiles to penetrate any defense system.26 Bernstein also stated, “It is clear
that Russian nuclear strategy today encompasses a concept for deterring and
terminating conventional war based
on the threat of limited nuclear strikes
for the purposes of ‘demonstration’ and
‘de-escalation.’”27 Despite great reductions in nuclear weapon stockpiles by
the United States and Russia since the
1980s, now nine countries have nuclear
weapons programs, most with bombs
significantly larger than those used at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945
(Table 1).
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Table 2. Major Types of Deployed Nuclear Weapons in 2014 by Delivery System, With
Explosive Yields and the Equivalent Number of Bombs Needed To Ignite 1,300 Square
Kilometers (~5 Tg C Emission)35
Bomb Type
(Deployed Warheads, Number)

Yield,
Burn
Burned Equivalent
Total
KT
Radius, km Area, km2
Number
Yield, KT

Country

Air-dropped
Hiroshima

United States

15

2.0

13

100

1,500

B61-12 (in production)

United States

50

3.2

32

40.3

2,016

China

90

4.1

52

25.2

2,267

ALCM (78)

United States

150

5.0

78

16.7

2,511

B61-3/-4 (184)

United States

170

5.2

86

15.1

2,575

Russia

200

5.6

98

13.3

2,660

DH-10 ALCM (150)

AS-15A/B ALCM (72)
Rafale C/M F3 (50)

France

300

6.6

135

9.6

2,884

B61-7/11, B83-1 (11)

United States

1,200

11.4

410

3.2

3,806

SLBM
Mk-4/4A, 4x (660)

United States

100

4.2

56

23.2

2,315

United Kingdom

100

4.2

56

23.2

2,315

M45/M51, 4x (48)

France

100

4.2

56

23.2

2,315

RSM-54/56, 4x (144)

Russia

100

4.2

56

23.2

2,315

JL-1/2 (48)

China

300

6.6

135

9.6

2,884

United States

475

7.9

195

6.7

3,162

300

6.6

135

9.6

2,884

Trident II D5, 3x (48)

Mk-5, 4x (300)

ICBM
Mk-21 (250)

United States

Mk-12A, 3x (220)

United States

335

6.9

148

8.8

2,949

Russia

800

9.7

296

4.4

3,510

RS-12M2/12M (177)

Land-based missiles
DF-21 (<100)

China

300

6.6

135

9.6

2,884

DF-3A/4 (10)

China

3,300

17.1

921

1.4

4,660

DF-5A (20)

China

5,000

20.2

1,284

1.0

5,063

Note. The approximate relationship of the radius of the area burned relative to blast yield, Rkm = 0.67 (KT)0.4, was calibrated to the firestorm
at Hiroshima.36 All bomb yields and numbers deployed, unless noted:37 B61-12;38 Russian and Chinese ALCM yields.39 Where bombs were
noted to have variable yields, the highest yields are shown; multiple warheads on single delivery vehicles are designated with “x.” Total
yield is equivalent number multiplied by individual yields.

Nuclear Drought:
Minimum Thresholds for
Nuclear Weapons Use and
Carbon Sources
Many currently deployed nuclear
weapons, such as air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCM), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), airdropped bombs, and land-based missiles, have explosive yields of 90 KT to
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5 megatons (MT), which are 6 to 330
times more powerful than those employed in previous atmospheric model
simulations that primarily assumed
multiple 15-KT explosions (Table 2).
The use of only one 5-MT land-based
missile deployed by China could burn
an area similar in size to that of one
hundred 15-KT explosions. Alternatively, if the United States dropped only
three 1.2-MT bombs, or used two Trident D5 SLBM (each with four 475-KT
warheads), the size of the explosions

WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

would exceed the land area required to
produce similar climate impacts. Use
of only four 800-KT Russian ICBMs
or ten 300-KT French gravity bombs
would also have similar climate impacts.
Thus, use of as few as 1 to 10 deployed
nuclear weapons, and fewer than 25 of
these prevalent types, from the five official nuclear weapons countries could
produce a nuclear drought; many of the
most prevalent types of strategic nuclear
weapons deployed by these countries
are shown (Table 2). For these five coun-
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Wikimedia Commons/Steve Gozzo

Kuwaiti oil fields burning after the Gulf War in 1991.

tries in total, there are roughly 1,682
warheads deployed that have yields between 100 and 300 KT; ~697 warheads
with yields between >300 and 800 KT;
and ~41 warheads with yields between
1 and 5 MT. Furthermore, the use of
smaller bombs by any actor could easily escalate into the use of larger weapons, such as any of the major types that
are deployed and shown here, although
new U.S. policy suggests the response to
any adversarial use of nuclear weapons
would elicit a “proportional” nuclear
response by the United States.31 Nuclear
drought events could also occur by regional nuclear exchanges between Pakistan and India (~6.6 Tg C), North Korea
or Russia and the United States, or Israel
and Iran, among many other possible
increasing numbers of combinations.32
Vegetation is not required to produce significant climate impacts. Even
in the desert Middle East, a single hightemperature nuclear explosion (e.g.,

JULY/AUGUST 2017

3,000–7,700°C) could ignite aboveground oil reserves, infrastructures,
and wellheads, and produce significant
stratospheric particle dispersion.33 A
nuclear explosion could create greater
climate impacts than the Kuwaiti oil
field fires of 1991 due to higher altitude
smoke dispersion into the stratosphere
and more wellheads potentially being ignited. During the Gulf War in 1991, Kuwaiti oil wells were set on fire in January
and some burned until November, when
they were actively extinguished. At a rate
of ~3,400 metric tons of soot emitted per
day for approximately 6 months, ~0.6 Tg
of black carbon was dispersed into the
troposphere from 610 ignited wells.34

Climate Change, Nuclear
Energy, and Nuclear Weapons
Many developed and developing
countries (i.e., China, India, Pakistan,

WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Russia,
among others) are expanding or plan to
expand their nuclear energy sectors.40
As a source of energy for development
and to mitigate anthropogenic climate
change, the global expansion of nuclear
energy is recognized by many observers
to also increase the probability of future
nuclear weapons events.41
In 2016, North Korea conducted two
nuclear weapons tests and related missile tests showing that the country is
developing advanced capabilities. North
Korea’s September 9, 2016, nuclear test
was the 2,056th nuclear test conducted
since 1945 by one of eight countries.42
On January 27, 2017, satellite photos
indicated that North Korea had also
resumed plutonium production at the
Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which had
produced fuel for its previous nuclear
tests.43 With associated spent fuel reprocessing, the Yongbyon facility can pro-
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Associated Press

duce ~6 kg per year of weapons-grade
plutonium (>93% plutonium-239),
enough for roughly one bomb per year.44
Yongbyon is one of 16 significant reprocessing facilities globally; each country
with a nuclear weapons program has at
least one facility.45 Iran also has many
reasons to want a nuclear weapons program, including developing a deterrent
against its two main rivals, the United
States and Israel, both nuclear powers.
Iran has key nuclear facilities in Arak,
Bushehr, Natanz, Qom, and Parchin
to enrich uranium and dramatically
shorten the time to “break out” the production of nuclear weapons. Iran has
also invested in developing new missiles
that analysts believe can carry a nuclear
payload.46
Further nuclear threats include terrorists obtaining fissile materials from
either existing official nuclear weapons
states (United States, Russia, United
Kingdom, France, China) or unofficial
countries (India, Pakistan, Israel, North
Korea) or from any of the 450 nuclear
power facilities operating in 30 countries globally.47 To prevent nuclear terrorism from occurring, governments
have primarily sought to secure all fissile nuclear materials internationally.48
These existing and increasing nuclear threats will be further impacted
by fossil-fueled anthropogenic climate
change, which will increase the probability of future conflicts.49 Over the
long term, potential sea-level rise by
4 to >6 meters by 2100 could result in
more than a billion migrants, which
could also exacerbate global conflicts.50
Escalation of conflicts to limited nuclear
confrontations could result from any
or all of these factors, especially given
Missiles paraded in North Korea to celebrate the 105th birthday of Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang,
enough time for such events to occur.
April 15, 2017.

Risk Assessment, Perception,
and Ethical Considerations
One measure of the relative attention
given to critical environmental issues
over time is the frequency of words occurring in published books. The relative
frequency of “nuclear war” and “nuclear
weapons” peaked in English books in

28   ENVIRONMENT

1986 and 1987, respectively (Figure 1).
“Climate change” became a relatively
dominant term beginning in 2001, with
“global warming” being less prevalent.
“Nuclear winter” also peaked in 1987,
and “nuclear autumn” has been used
even less, with both terms occurring at

WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

least 80 times less frequently than “climate change” by 2008. Due to the relative prevalence of “nuclear weapons”
since the 1960s, emphasis on these issues is likely to continue. Such language
terms are also imprecise and vague, and
could describe a multitude of phenom-
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Wikimedia Commons/US Department of Defense

A 21 KT nuclear explosion with battleships for size reference at Bikini Atoll, July 25,1946. The world’s largest nuclear bomb deployed today by
China (5 MT) is 238 times larger and could ignite ~1280 square kilometers of land.
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Figure 1. Nuclear weapons “on our minds”: The relative frequency of nuclear
weapons and climate change issues in English books, 1945–2008.

Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://books.google.com/ngrams.

ena, which is why such terms need to
be accompanied by specific numbers
and further qualifying descriptors to be
meaningful.51
A multitude of changing forces have
shaped public discourse on diverse environmental topics over the last century.52 Most environmental politics have
tended to approach problems on regional scales due to local political power
dynamics, which may have limited concern for nuclear climate impacts that
would occur on a global scale.53 Yet in
2017, the World Economic Forum recognized weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs, which primarily include nuclear weapons) to be the largest potential negative impact for the global economy out of all major threats in the next
10 years.54 Past trends also reflect the
nature of nuclear weapons as fast-acting
and immediate risks relative to climate
change concerns, which have been seen
by many as more of a long-term issue.
But even to limit temperature increases
to 2°C, projections of carbon emissions
under the 2016 Paris Agreement would
still require undeveloped and optimistic negative emissions technology to be
employed at scale by ~2030, suggesting the immense magnitude of the task
posed to mitigate the destructive effects
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of anthropogenic climate change, and
explaining why nuclear energy may be
more prevalent in the future as a reduced-emissions energy source.55
As a result of recent developments in
nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, and climate change, the Doomsday Clock was
set 2 minutes closer to midnight in 2015,
and in 2017 the clock moved 30 seconds
closer, to 2½ minutes to midnight, due
to global political developments; this is
the closest to midnight since 1953, after
the United States and Russia first tested
thermonuclear bombs.56 Despite ominous risk assessments from the World
Economic Forum, the Doomsday Clock,
and many others discussed in the preceding, social incentives interfere with
our risk perception, in addition to prevalent psychological tendencies that also
cause us to underestimate risks.57 The
philosopher of science Karl Popper similarly warned of our narrow perspectives:
“Our own ways of life are still beset by taboos; food taboos, taboos of politeness,
and many others.”58 Financial incentives
can also interfere with scientific judgment, as recently elaborated by the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences: “Judges
and juries, however, must consider financial conflicts of interest when assessing scientific testimony. The threshold

WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG

for pursuing the possibility of bias must
be low. In some instances, judges have
been frustrated in identifying expert
witnesses who are free of conflict of interest because entire fields of science
seem to be co-opted by payments from
industry.”59 Institutional incentives on
science have also recently been asserted
to limit the identification of true novel
relationships, as opposed to the repeated
production of false positives.60 Corporate executives also recognize powerful internal and external forces that can
undermine business performance and
increase unnecessary risks.61
Beyond the social and institutional
issues, the values behind our actions are
also defined by philosophy and religion.
Our moral responses to the threats of
nuclear weapons, or to any ethical issue,
evolve as the result of complex moral
reasoning, interpretation, and our personal histories.62 Ethical dilemmas such
as determining the “best” approach to
the problems of nuclear weapons, unfortunately, will not be resolved by recourse to facts alone, nor can any final
moral conclusions be obtained by philosophy.63 Despite such uncertainty, any
management of nuclear weapons should
clearly try to minimize harm to civilian
populations to the highest degree pos-

VOLUME 59

NUMBER 4

Nuclear Weapons in Transition

Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

As the climate implications of the
limited use of nuclear weapons become more widely recognized and better characterized, specialized nuclear
weapons, such as electromagnetic pulse

(EMP) devices that are detonated
at an altitude of >25 km, may become preferable alternatives that
would not oxidize terrestrial carbon but could still serve strategic
objectives.66 When detonated, an
EMP device ionizes atmospheric
molecules and creates a massive
surge of free electrons that can
overload electrical systems and
cause widespread failures, thus
disrupting the ionosphere, as opposed to the biosphere. In 1962,
a U.S. EMP test with a 1.4-MT
nuclear explosion at an altitude
of ~400 km above sea level unexpectedly caused streetlights to
burn out and a communications
system failure in Honolulu, Hawaii, which was ~1,100 km from
the epicenter of the blast.67 Most
electrical systems across a broad
area under such an EMP explosion would become nonfunctional; the blast would only harm
people who are directly dependent on electrical devices for survival,
but the global climate implications from
the use of conventional nuclear weapons
would be averted. Uses of EMP devices
have been widely discussed as probable
strategic applications of nuclear weapons, although their possible exclusive
Wikimedia Commons/US Department of Defense

sible; however, even the indirect climate
effects of limited use of nuclear weapons
on noncivilian targets may still be able
to kill a billion people.
When considering the immense
risks to global human well-being posed
by the climate effects of limited nuclear
weapons use and the associated spread
of toxic radionuclides, it appears entirely appropriate to reflect on the massively devastating and nearly continuous wars of global history; perhaps we
should not be overly optimistic and rely
too much on the notion that “this time is
different.”64 Where we do not act due to
our conflicting obligations, where is the
threshold that identifies us as bystanders to the grand perils of nuclear weapons use?65 All of these social, cultural,
and ethical factors have the potential to
create biased evaluations and influence
our perceptions and actions concerning
the climate change risks and other hazards from nuclear weapons.

Nuclear ballistic missiles on parade in Moscow, May 2014.
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An electromagnetic pulse created by a 1.4 MT
atmospheric nuclear explosion at an altitude
of 400 km.

use instead of conventional bombs has
received less attention.68
In summary, as long as conventional nuclear weapons are prevalent,
the breadth of existing research indicates that the question is not whether
a nuclear drought can occur, but what
factors increase its probability of occurring and what actions can be taken
to mitigate the potentially devastating global impacts. Even in the 1950s,
John von Neumann, Princeton professor of mathematical physics, creator of
game theory, and a major designer of
the modern computer (which was used
primarily for nuclear weapons development), thought “atomic war was almost
certainly unavoidable”—a conclusion
that Stephen Hawking echoes today.69
Is sufficient action being taken today to
avoid the limited use of nuclear weapons in the future and avert the potential for devastating climate impacts and
the associated spread of toxic radionuclides? Accumulated research is already specific enough to provide adequate incentives to approach the
problem of nuclear drought with a new
urgency. The storage of nuclear spent
fuel rods in vulnerable facilities also
needs greater attention, as the Fuku-
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Wikimedia Commons/US Department of Defense

Atmospheric particle dispersion from a 10 MT nuclear bomb test, ‘Ivy Mike’, October 31, 1952.

shima disaster dramatically showed.
More research is needed for a better
understanding of the probability of nuclear weapon events and to foster more
adequate responses and alternative solutions to these serious global challenges
for a future sustainable environment.
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